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Development impact fee systems are a controversial topic among developers and planners. This article proposes that
the use of locationally-sensitive impact fee methodologies can have positive effects on the cost of development and
the price of the final product. The authors caution local officials against jumping on the "development fee bandwagon,"
and using fees to raise new revenues rather than as a regulatory measure to meet growth needs.
Development impact fee systems provoke heated debate
among proponents and opponents concerning the equity
of cost-shifting, the incidence of who ultimately bears such
costs, and the effectiveness or efficiency of marginal cost
techniques in the provision of new infrastructure.
The recent publication of Paying for Growth: Using
Development Fees to Finance Infrastructure by the Urban
Land Institute, may cause opponents of impact fee systems
to voice renewed justification for their positions, based
upon the report's summary conclusions. But before every
builder, developer and realtor heeds the clarion call of the
report to rush to the steps of his statehouse in order to
seek statutory prohibitons to impact fees, it would be well
to remember the sad state of affairs surrounding the
current infrastructure financing crisis. The continued
rejection of local infrastructure bond tax initiatives; mora-
toriums; uncertainty, extortion and regulatory delay; and
decreasing federal and state assistance are the very reasons
that "surrogates" for infrastructure adequacy, in the form
of fair share development fees, were originally conceived.
The authors of this article were among the first to cau-
tion against the perils and pitfalls of badly conceived
development fee systems and poorly constructed impact
assessment methodologies. Such systems can exhibit most
of the serious defects and consequences alleged in the UL1
report. However, properly conceived and designed meth-
odologies may just as well have neutral to positive effects
on the equity, incidence, efficiency and politics of impact
fee systems.
The Trend Toward Cost-shifting
Simultaneously faced with deteriorating existing infra-
structure and growth-generated requirements for expanded
facilities, local governments have begun to focus upon
development fees as promising alternatives to increased
local taxes. As a result, the local development community
has become the target of an array of new impact-oriented,
cost-shifting techniques employed to permit each new
development project to pay its "fair share" of new in-
frastructure demands. The early efforts to implement
development impact fee concepts focused upon issues of
legal defensibility. As a result of the pioneering efforts
and litigative experiences of a variety of leading edge
communities and practitioners, the converging base of
judicial standards and tests upholding police power de-
velopment fees has been established.
Having discovered the general formula for legal accep-
tance, far too many communities are leaping on the
development fee bandwagon with only a minimal under-
standing of the operative effect and implication inherent
in the mechanics of the endless variety of impact assess-
ment and fee apportionment methodologies. The politics
of preparation and public hearing related to a proposed
new system are generally highly debated and controver-
sial. The eventually adopted ordinance represents an
uncomfortable compromise among political expediencies,
methodological tinkering, urgent facility needs, and the
perceived underlying urge to reform the way infrastruc-
ture was formerly locally financed.
The attendant public debate invariably centers on asser-
tions by proponents that growth should pay its own way,
that new development should pay its fair share of new
costs, and that the new system will foster the growth
management objectives of more efficient provision and
utilization of facilities. Opponents counter-argue constitu-
tional and statutory taxation and taking issues, intergen-
erational inequities, rising costs of development, housing
unaffordability, and anti-business, non-competitive eco-
nomic disadvantages which will result from such new fees.
There is no end to the availability of literature and
advice concerning the judicial standards supporting the
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new development exaction and fee systems now prolifer-
ating. However, until recently, very little serious research
has been, or could have been, undertaken to provide a
common basis of empirical evidence concerning the opera-
tive effects of marginal cost impact fee methodologies,
because of their lack of longevity Now a number of pub-
lished surveys, case studies and similar research efforts
are beginning to appear.
The ULI report has made a major contribution to a
common framework for analysis by both proponents and
opponents of the operative effects of impact fee metho-
dologies. Based upon its summary conclusions, the report
cannot be characterized as a level or neutral playing field
for analysis, but more as the first significant effort to
attempt to develop design standards for the location and
construction of the ballpark. Tom Snyder, Mike Stegman
and the ULI are to be commended for their significant
efforts.
Equitable and Efficient by Whose Standard?
Traditionally, infrastructure at the local government
level has largely been financed through the property tax
on land and improvement values. From an equity stand-
point, this means individual taxpayers bear financial
responsibility for infrastructure according to their "ability
to pay," not on the basis of use or impact, which is the
"benefit" principle of equity. The benefit principle is
similar to the private competitive market principles where
individuals must pay specifically for the goods or services
they consume. Development fees represent a political
policy shift to the benefit principle, requiring new de-
velopment to pay its "fair share" of new infrastructure:
requirements on a proportional impact basis rather than
on a value basis.
The private market theory of free competition suggests
that price is the primary determinant of economic effi-
ciency. In the public good and service finance arena, user
fees, development fees and impact fees are most akin to
the benefit principle of equity, while taxes on value rep-
resent the other end of the equity spectrum. Price, as
represented by either taxes or fees, allocates resources most
efficiently when price approaches or equals the marginal
cost of producing an additional unit of infrastructure.
Marginal cost pricing is said to occur naturally in the
fantasyland of perfect competition. To the extent that
market failures exist in the private sector or that the public
sector is providing infrastructure at prices below marginal
cost, infrastructure is allocated inefficiently. To the extent
that the development of land imposes ability-to-pay costs
on the community-at-large and the developer does not pay
his proportional, fair share of such costs, there will exist
inefficient spatial location of development and inefficient
allocation of the costs to various land uses.
Opponents of marginal cost approaches to infrastruc-
ture financing argue that the benefit principle of equity
results in a reallocation of former costs, previously bor-
rowed or deferred by the community-at-large through
taxes, to new fees to the development project which raise
the cost of development and ultimately the cost of the end
product. The next extrapolation is to argue that new
businesses and new residents, without voice, are being
treated unfairly in relation to established ones, raising new
questions of intergenerational equity and incidence of bur-
den. Equity, efficiency and incidence issues are debated
hotly within the context of competing ability-to-pay and
benefit views on equity, an extension of the traditional
City Hall political debates relating to "them versus us,"
"neighborhood versus developer," etc.
A third view of equity, the horizontal equity principle,
provides a more rational framework for such issues. The
principle of horizontal equity holds that people in similar
situations should be treated similarly, or that they should
contribute the same amount to the financing of infrastruc-
ture. This view of equity is complementary to both other
views, and most appropriate to planning, development
regulation and growth management considerations of a
spatial, geographic dimension. This view of equity per-
mits assessment of financing techniques to be addressed
compatibly with the more traditional concerns of the plan-
ner for location, timing and sequencing of infrastructure.
Horizontal equity permits public policy to concentrate
first on the political values of capital programming, ade-
quacy of facilities and the pattern of future land use and
development as they affect the utilization of current ex-
cess capacity, the problems of existing deficiencies and the
planning for needed new infrastructure in terms of reality,
not just theory. Both the private sector and the public sec-
tor agree that the financing of new infrastructure should
encourage economic efficiency, orderly development and
the optimum use of public facilities. Debate remains
polarized between the pros and cons of appropriate alter-
native financing techniques based upon the effects of
"ability-to-pay" versus "benefit" approaches.
Equity, Efficiency and Incidence
The horizontal equity view can serve to level the play-
ing field for debate. The crux of most debate centers on
issues of intergenerational equity. Opponents of impact
fees allege that they somehow apply differently to estab-
lished versus new residents or businesses. The horizontal
equity view totally destroys this argument because the
financing of infrastructure will fall equally upon all res-
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idents or businesses, new or existing, who chose to make
a common or similar locational decision. It is immaterial
whether a new development has financed its on- and off-
site costs via a special taxing district or an impact fee
system (both constitute forms of marginal cost-shifting).
Those who purchase a home in a certain development
are paying as a result of their locational decision. In real-
ity, the largest market for new housing is not new, in-
migrating residents, but existing residents desiring new
homes. The intergenerational arguments dissolve when
tested against horizontal equity.
The costs which new development may impose on a
city for new infrastructure differ from location to loca-
tion and vary by type of use. For development to be effi-
cient, these costs must be considered in making either
private or public capital investment decisions. All other
externalities being equal, private development locating
where costs are lowest is most efficient. However, private
investment decisions to locate elsewhere, due to the private
benefits of view, waterfront or similar amenities, reflect
the incorporation of higher offsetting private benefits. To
the extent that all development is required to assume its
actual, locationally distinct marginal infrastructure costs,
it can be considered efficient. The horizontal view of
equity again reduces the efficiency test of development
to the locationally sensitive price decision for the home
buyer, whether new or current resident.
Achieving efficient provision and utilization of public
infrastructure is believed to occur where use is equal to
the marginal costs of provision and when benefits exceed
costs in the provision of infrastructure. If orderly develop-
ment and efficient use of public facilities are to be en-
couraged, we must recognize the limits of the pragmatic
applicability of the various views of equity as they are
assumed to operate in the pure, competitive market arena.
Alternative financing techniques which shift costs further
along the spectrum in the direction of more nearly equat-
ing actual marginal unit costing reinforce efficiency
considerations.
With the property tax general obligation bond, we have
the least financing technique. Then comes the geographi-
cally defined special taxing district, followed by the
generalized, zonal approach to impact fees. The most
equitable approach, however, embraces the use of highly
locationally-sensitive computerized models for assigning
impact fees.
Impact fee systems that are locationally precise and sen-
sitive most completely define the truest off-site costs of
a development. Such systems reflect lower off-site costs
attributable to existing unused capacity within close
proximity and conversely reflect higher off-site costs at-
tributable to seriously deficient capacity problems in close
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proximity. To the extent that the form of financing of such
costs represents the truest marginal cost, as do impact fees
versus special tax district or general obligation bonds, the
impact fee supports more efficient use and provision of
public facilities than other alternatives.
Efficient production and consumption of housing are
most directly affected by the price of land, costs of fi-
nancing and the supply of buildable sites. The optimum
allocation environment is the purely competitive free
market. The real world for production and consumption
of housing is the local political jurisdiction. A myriad of
constantly changing factors distort the type and quantity
of housing that is built and consumed in a local jurisdic-
tion. This is also true for non-residential uses.
The most obvious distortion factors relate to the rate
of growth being experienced at any point in time. Both
production and consumption are affected by periods of
rapid growth, slow or declining growth rates, the avail-
ability of and rates for financing, inflationary pressures
on labor and material costs and the effects of speculation
and inflation in land costs.
Property taxes, special assessments, exactions and im-
pact fees have the effect of increasing the cost of housing
relative to other goods, thereby lowering their consump-
tion below efficient levels. Since infrastructure must be
provided from one of these alternatives, the horizontal
view of equity would support a marginal cost approach
as the better alternative to make up these payments for
infrastructure.
There is substantial agreement that local government
attitudes toward growth reflected by their regulatory sys-
tems, their support or non-support of bond financing and
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their pro-growth versus no-growth orientation have
played a significant role in the provision or restriction of
available supplies of developed land with respect to de-
mand. The more time-consuming the regulatory process
and the more growth-restricting the community's attitude,
the less available are adequate supplies of developable
land. Such factors similarly distort the production and
consumption of housing in terms of economic efficiency.
The effects of the factors described above, taken alone
or in combination, distort production and consumption.
Furthermore, they affect the price of housing by dwarfing
the absolute cost of locationally-sensitive impact fees.
When sound planning, linked capital programming sys-
tems, streamlined regulatory procedures and locationally-
sensitive, methodologically correct impact fees systems
are well integrated, they can have a neutral to positive
effect upon development costs and the price of the fin-
ished product. This is particularly true when the results
of such integrated growth management systems remove
artificial or theretofore unresolved political constraints on
the supply of developable land.
The issue of incidence of burden, or who pays, is greatly
affected by the methodological approach inherent in the
chosen financing technique. Stegman and Snyder imply
that the only "fair" methods are continued general obliga-
tion bonds or special taxing districts spreading the costs
to all according to their ability to pay. The development
community would argue that charging impact fees re-
quires such costs to be added directly to the final price
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of its product, thereby raising the cost of housing to the
new resident. This is similar to moving the incidence of
who pays from the developer to the buyer of new homes,
or forward shifting such costs.
Since property values reflect underlying economic
usage, it is not unusual to find a typical single family
house appraised at $60 per square foot while an office
complex is appraised at $80 to $120 per square foot in
the same locale. The developer of commercial property
therefore can argue, under the ability-to-pay principle
of taxes, that he is and has been paying up to twice as
much or more per square foot than residential property
developers.
In fact, when contrasted with a fair share peak hour
road impact fee system, using the marginal cost benefit
principle, office buildings usually generate only one-third
of the peak hour traffic that the equivalent square footage
in single family homes generate. Only in the rarest of con-
ditions, when the uniform market value of office property
equals three times the per square foot value of residential
property, can the price of infrastructure under taxes be
said to be fair or equal in the marginal cost sense, relative
to impact fees.
Uniform fee schedules which incorporate overgeneral-
ized zonal service areas provide no incentive for devel-
opment to occur in one location or another. Precision
systems incorporating high degrees of locational sensi-
tivity, such as the pioneering Broward County, Florida
TRIPS system, represent the leading edge of fair share
marginal cost impact fee practice.
Such locationally-sensitive systems have two other sig-
nificant attributes. They promote efficient use of currently
existing capacity by providing a more accurate assessment
of impacts and incentives in the form of lower fees to
developers choosing to build in locations where capacity
exists. The locationally-sensitive system similarly facili-
tates the truest incorporation of such impact fee costs into
the total land improvement cost data upon which invest-
ment decisions are made, thus permitting both short- and
long-term site acquisition decisions to incorporate said fees
into land acquisition price negotiations. The result is a
high propensity for such fees to be capitalized or offset
in the price paid for land.
The Politics of Impact Fees
Impact fees find their legal base under the police power
and as such are extensions of traditional planning and
regulatory activities. They are integral components of
policy decisions relating to the provision of adequate
facilities and services, not unlike other regulatory min-
imum requirements found in traditional subdivision and
zoning ordinances. There is a growing tendency, however,
Fall, 1987, vol. 13, no. 1 21
of many local governments to view impact fees as a
panacea for instant new revenues resulting in a distortion
of the motives that should exist for their adoption. The
raising of revenue becomes the objective, not the regu-
latory requirement that development provide adequate
facilities both on- and off-site in a marginal cost, fair share
manner.
Far too many planners and elected officials view impact
fees as new sources of discretionary revenues. In fact, the
rash of poorly conceived, overgeneralized, minimally
locationally-sensitive methodologies sweeping the coun-
try promotes the revenue versus regulatory view of im-
pact fees. The operative effect of these poor methodologies
is to force the development community, through the police
power ploy, to pay fees into local trust funds in order that
local governments can expend such funds in a manner
meeting the flimsiest benefit test and remain legal. The
ULI report attempts to point out that among the short-
comings of impact fees is their loss of expenditure discre-
tion. In reality, the benefit-expenditure test of impact fees
is the paramount safeguard that the development com-
munity should be demanding from their fee payments.
It should come as no surprise that the proposed adop-
tion of an impact fee ordinance should raise concerns on
the part of the development community. Stegman and
Snyder have articulated the abusive effects of poorly con-
ceived, non-locationally sensitive impact fee methodol-
ogies. On top of ever-changing ordinance requirements
and increasing processing delays, the development com-
munity understandably reacts to oppose impact fees as
adding to its problems. On the other hand, the general
taxpayer, particularly in high growth environments, feels
compelled to reject ever-burgeoning taxes to subsidize new
development and is supportive of any technique which
purports to shift the costs to the developers or users of
new development projects, regardless of the operative
effect of the chosen methodology.
The more a chosen impact fee methodology looks and
operates like a tax, the greater the likelihood that it will
exhibit all of the serious consequences and defects alleged
by Stegman and Snyder. The effects of such methodol-
ogies are incompatible with all three views of equity, and
magnify the distortionary impacts upon goals of equity,
efficiency and incidence. The more a chosen impact fee
methodology seeks to emulate California's "impact taxes,"
the greater the likelihood that such fees will fall short of
fair share, marginal cost objectives and benefit-expenditure
tests.
Facility Type Methodologies
The concept of horizontal equity provides decision-
makers with the most effective forum for consideration
of infrastructure financing alternatives. Private market
decisions and public facility costs share one common at-
tribute which distinguishes one project from another, and
which impacts successful market and financing decisions
. . . location, location, location! To the extent that chosen
methodologies can, within state-of-the-art professional
and technical competence, isolate fair share, proportional
impacts of site specific or locationally common impacts
upon specific infrastructure capacities, it should be incum-
bent upon government to do so for all police power
regulatory development fee systems. In so doing, the
operative distinction between a tax and a fee are made
apparent, and the best approximation of proportional im-
pacts and fair share assessments can be achieved.
Fairness and equity in application among "development
projects," large and small, is best demonstrated to poten-
tial payers of development fees when their "fair share" is
clearly distinguished by their locational investment deci-
sion in relationship to adequate facilities. Private market
development decisions are based upon the total estimate
of acquisitions, development, and improvement costs,
which vary among locations.
Development fees are in reality surrogates for the same
project's off-site infrastructure costs and should vary in
precisely the same manner to assure minimal method-
ological distortion of cost effects on development and
housing. Facility type methodologies should express the
proportionate relationships among location, facility ser-
vice area, minimum accepted standards for facilities ade-
quacy and costs for utilization or expansion of existing
or needed capacity.
Facility type methodologies, to the extent possible,
should reflect clearly articulated public facility and service
standards and locational determinants in coordination
with the community comprehensive plan. These standards
should constitute the minimum level of service adequacy
declared as public policy. Only with such declaration of
measurable standards can existing excess capacity or
deficiency be properly determined and further needs
projected.
The ultimate political reality of properly conceived,
locationally-sensitive fair share impact methodology is a
new degree of regulatory certainty. Such systems serve
to limit the developer's liability in comparison to the selec-
tive and arbitrary employment of negotiated exactions
and extortionary practices which fall almost exclusively
on the medium to large scale developer.
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